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Up the River Without a Permit: Why the Water
Transfers Rule Endangers the Louisiana Wetlands
INTRODUCTION
The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) in the Clean Water Act (CWA) has been referred to as
the “linchpin,” the “centerpiece,” and the “most important
component” of the Clean Water Act.1 The NPDES permitting
program is a major part of the invaluable protection the CWA
provides for the Nation’s waters. Congress enacted the CWA in
response to a growing crisis in the waters of the United States. In
1972 Congress took a more aggressive stance on pollution control
while maintaining a realistic view of the industrialized society
Americans live in. The CWA allows the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to set maximum effluent limits for navigable waters
and then issue permits so as to keep the pollution levels below
those limits. Without a permit, it is unlawful to execute “any
addition of any pollutant into navigable waters from any point
source.”2
At some point in the early 2000s, the EPA began to champion a
theory known as the Unitary Waters Theory. The theory posits that
each individual body of water in the United States is not distinct
and individual at all, but rather is part of one unitary whole. If all
waters are part of the same whole, a transfer from one to another
will never be an “addition” to the whole. Under the Unitary Waters
Theory, the Colorado River in the west and the Delaware River in
the east are considered the same body of water. Therefore, taking a
pollutant from the Delaware River and adding it to the Colorado
River would not be an addition of a pollutant. This example
highlights the flaw of the Unitary Waters Theory.
Remarkably, even after receiving no support in the court
system, the EPA still promulgated a notice and comment rule in
the hope that the Unitary Waters Theory would gain legitimacy.
Publishing an already flawed argument does not remove the flaws.
However, upon conducting the Chevron Test for deference to
agency action, the Eleventh Circuit concluded the wording of the
statute is ambiguous on whether the waters of the United States
should be considered a collection of independent and distinct water

Copyright 2004, by MICHAEL E. LANDIS.
1. Chris Reagen, The Water Transfers Rule: How an EPA Rule Threatens
to Undermine the Clean Water Act, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 307, 312 (2011).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2012).
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bodies or one unitary whole.3 Further, the court held that the
EPA’s Water Transfer Theory, now formalized as the Water
Transfers Rule, was a reasonable interpretation of the Section 402
requirements in the CWA.4 As one commentator put it, “one may
be better off drinking whiskey than the dirty water the EPA is
fighting to save from NPDES regulation through its unitary waters
theory.”5
This Comment will outline the myriad of problems caused by
the Water Transfers Rule and how it affects Louisiana in
particular. It will analyze the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Friends
of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District6
and explain why the court erred in granting Chevron deference to
the rule, including why the statute is clear and why the EPA’s
interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. It will also describe
why concerns over federal usurpation of state responsibility are
misplaced. After establishing that the Water Transfers Rule is
flawed and that NPDES permits should be required for transfers
from one meaningfully distinct body of water to another, this
Comment will determine that the Louisiana wetlands are a
meaningfully distinct body of water, separate from the Mississippi
River and the Gulf of Mexico. For this reason, Water Quality
Standards and Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) should be
established for the Louisiana wetlands. Any transfer of water
containing pollutants into the wetlands should require an NPDES
permit under Section 402 of the CWA. This Comment will
conclude by addressing concerns that a permitting system is overly
expensive absent the Water Transfers Rule and establish that using
the existing NPDES permitting program along with a Water
Quality Credit Trading Program will keep the permitting cost
down and produce real reductions in pollutant discharges into the
wetlands.
I. BACKGROUND
Federal water regulation began as a way for the government to
assert control over the Nation’s waters to promote interstate
commerce. As industrialization took its toll on the waters, the
Federal Government began to take on the role of protecting the
3. Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210,
1228 (11th Cir. 2009).
4. Id.
5. Heidi Hande, Is the EPA’s Unitary Waters Theory All Wet?, 6 WYO. L.
REV. 401, 404 (2006).
6. 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009).
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water itself in the interest of the health of the environment. As
legislation progressed, the balance between federal and state
control over the waters has changed as well, ultimately leading to a
healthy balance where the Federal Government sets a general
framework within which the states are free to assert their own
regulations. In response to overly ambitious goals, the more recent
trend in water regulation has been towards enacting regulations
that promote feasible solutions to water pollution.
A. Pre Clean Water Act Legislation Falls Short of Accomplishing
Clean Water
The first instance of federal regulation of the Nation’s
waterways occurred in 1899 with the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriations Act (RHAA).7 Since then, the Federal Government
has expanded its control over the waters of the United States in
both a commercial and an environmental interest. The RHAA
included several sections that are still in force today, including
Section 108 and Section 13, also known as the Refuse Act.9 Section
10 made it unlawful “to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter
or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of” navigable
waters.10 Section 10 mandates a permit to alter the course of a
United States waterway.11 The Refuse Act made it unlawful to
discharge refuse into navigable waters or their tributaries.12
In 1948, the Federal Government took on a more supportive
role, secondary to the states, by passing The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).13 Under the FWPCA, the Federal
Government provided money and technical services to state
pollution control programs.14 However, this supportive role of the
Federal Government did not last long.
In 1961 Congress passed a set of amendments that returned
responsibility for water pollution control back to the Federal
Government. These amendments increased federal power to
initiate enforcement conferences, although initiation of these
7. Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More than Five-and-a-Half
Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for
the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 529 (2005).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012).
9. Murchison, supra note 7, at 529. The Refuse Act is now integrated into
Section 402 of the Clean Water Act.
10. 33 U.S.C. § 403.
11. Id.
12. Murchison, supra note 7, at 529; 33 U.S.C. § 407.
13. Murchison, supra note 7, at 530.
14. Id.
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conferences still required a state governor’s request.15
Significantly, the 1961 amendments also broadened the definition
of “interstate or navigable waters” to include all coastal waters.16
In 1965 Congress passed The Water Quality Act.17 The Water
Quality Act was another expansion of the Federal Government’s
responsibility to control water pollution in that the Act
implemented the establishment of water quality standards for
interstate waters.18 States were to create these standards and submit
them to the new Water Pollution Control Administration for
approval before implementation.19 The shortcomings of these
amendments were that they did not allow for a federal
implementation plan in the event of a state’s failure to act, nor did
they control individual sources of pollution.20 These failures would
be addressed within ten years.
Unfortunately, none of these amendments had much effect on
improving the water quality of the United States.21 Prior to 1970,
the Federal Government initiated just one enforcement action
under the FWPCA.22 In fact, were it not for two Supreme Court
decisions expanding the power of the Refuse Act in pollution
control,23 the FWPCA might have been nothing more than a farce.
B. The 1972 Amendments Become the CWA
In 1972 the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio caught fire
because of high levels of pollutants on the river’s surface. This
incident alerted Congress to the harm incurred by the
industrialization of the 20th century.24 The Cuyahoga disaster
prompted Congress to pass the Water Pollution Control Act of
1972.
Because the FWPCA was well accepted by diverse groups,
many of the substantive parts of the FWPCA were retained in the
CWA.25 Generally, the 1972 Amendments focused on feasibility.26
15. Id. at 532.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Murchison, supra note 7, at 532.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 534.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 534–35 (discussing United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362
U.S. 482 (1960); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966)).
24. Reagen, supra note 1, at 311.
25. The Act of 1972 had the support of different groups including industrial
dischargers, environmental groups, local governments, and farmers. Murchison,
supra note 7, at 536–37. Industrial dischargers supported the Act because it
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The Amendments established pollution standards for categories of
point sources, making the standards simpler and clearer for
industrial polluters.27 Point sources were distinguished into
existing and new point sources and then further distinguished into
those that were publicly owned and those that were non-publicly
owned.28 For existing point sources, both publicly and nonpublicly owned point sources had a two-step process for
implementation of new standards.29 Publicly owned treatment
works must “employ the best treatment control technology over the
life of the works.”30 Non-publicly owned point sources, on the
other hand, had to employ the “best practicable control technology
currently available” (BPT) by 1977 and since 1983, must now
employ the “best available control technology economically
achievable” (BAT).31 While these new standards added clarity and
certainty to the water pollution problem in the United States, the
most significant contribution to the feasibility-focused approach
was the creation of permits that made the standards more palatable
to industry.32

allowed for permits as a way around an absolute prohibition of discharges. Id.
Environmental groups supported it because it expanded the federal jurisdiction
beyond the navigable waters of the United States and created the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). Id. at 537. Local governments supported the Act
because it increased funding for their programs. Id. Farmers supported the Act
because it eased regulations on farming operations and discharges from fields.
Id.
26. Murchison, supra note 7, at 539.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 540.
31. Murchison, supra note 7, at 540. BPT standards directed the EPA to
establish standards based on what amounts to a cost-benefit analysis based on
how much it will cost to implement technologies that deliver different levels of
effluent reduction. In establishing BPT standards, the EPA looked at the average
of the best performers and was to recommend those when the cost of the
technology necessary to achieve those standards made them practical. Id. at 540
n.94. BAT standards differ from BPT standards in that the cost is now only one
factor to consider as opposed to the main factor to consider. BAT standards use
the best performers in an industrial category as the reference point and these
standards were to be implemented with only partial consideration of cost. Id. at
540 n.95.
32. While a full description of the permits introduced by the 1972
legislation is beyond the scope of this paper, many of the permits introduced
were maintained in the Clean Water Act and are still in effect today. See
Murchison, supra note 7, at 541–50.
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C. The Clean Water Act
The 1972 FWPCA came under fire for being both overly
ambitious and under-inclusive.33 Therefore, Congress once again
amended the legislation in an attempt to make pollution control
significant and realistic. This attempt is known as the 1977 Clean
Water Act.34
Section 301 of the CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants
into navigable waters.35 However, in keeping with the feasibility
approach, individuals or industries can obtain NPDES permits that
allow them to dump a set amount of pollutants into a certain body
of water at a certain point source.36 Included in Section 402 is a
provision that allows states to create their own NPDES programs
subject to EPA approval.37 The EPA may suspend or withdraw the
approval of a state’s program.38 Another important aspect of the
NPDES program is an individual’s ability to sue the EPA for a
failure to properly monitor the United States waterways.39
Significantly, the CWA kept the 1972 permit system as an attempt
to stay true to the feasibility approach to water quality control.
Two permits are of particular concern in this Comment:
Section 10 permits and Section 402 permits. Section 10 permits are
required whenever one wishes to alter the course or navigability of
a waterway of the United States40 and are mostly useful in
regulating the waterways as channels of commerce under the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.41 However,
Section 10 permits can also be used to regulate pollution. Section
402 provides for NPDES permits and are most significant because
they are most affected by the EPA’s Water Transfers Rule of
2008.42

33. Id. at 551 (criticizing the standards set as being impossible to obtain and
for not applying to nonpoint sources).
34. This name was chosen because the 1972 Act had already become known
as the Clean Water Act and this was merely codifying it.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012). See also S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 102 (2004).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1342; Hande, supra note 5, at 405–06.
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). Forty-seven of the 50 states have developed their
own NPDES permits. See Specific State Program Status, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/basics/State-Program-Status.cfm,
archived at http://perma.cc/A5ME-RDBX (last updated July 14, 2014).
38. Hande, supra note 5, at 406–07; 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
39. Hande, supra note 5, at 408.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 403.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) (2013).
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The NPDES is a step-by-step process. First, the EPA must set
water quality standards for each body of water.43 These standards
are established through Section 301 of the CWA, which directs
states to establish effluent limitations on all point sources.44 If the
standards can be met through available technology, the EPA will
issue NPDES permits in accordance with that technology and the
determined standards.45 If the established standards cannot be met
through the available technology, the EPA must then establish
TMDLs for each distinct water body and issue NPDES permits in
accordance with the TMDLs so that each point source is allowed to
contribute only a proportionate part of the TMDL.46 The complex
process for establishing water quality standards and issuing
NPDES permits, however, pales in comparison with the difficulty
of determining when an NPDES violation has occurred.
D. NPDES Violations Serve as the Centerpiece of the CWA
NPDES permitting requirements were enacted under Section
402 of the CWA. These permits replaced Section 13 Refuse Act
permits under the RHAA.47 An NPDES violation has five
elements: (1) there must be a discharge of (2) a pollutant (3) from
a point source (4) into navigable waters (5) without a permit.48
“Discharge of pollutants” as defined in the CWA is “any addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”49 It is
important to define “pollutant,” “navigable waters,” “point
source,” and most difficultly, “addition.”
First, the CWA defines “pollutant” narrowly. The CWA states,
“The term ‘pollutant’ means . . . ” without using includes.50 This
indicates the items listed are exhaustive and not merely
exemplary.51 The pollutants listed include, among other things,
biological materials, heat, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and agricultural
waste discharged into water.52 Additionally, the definition lists
certain things that are expressly excluded from the definition of
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (2012); Cozette Tran-Caffee, The Water Transfers
Rule: Weakening the Clean Water Act One Reasonable Interpretation at a Time,
37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 751, 756–57 (2010). A full description of how water quality
standards are determined is beyond the scope of this paper.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1311; Tran-Caffee, supra note 43, at 757.
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(3); Tran-Caffee, supra note 43, at 757.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(4); § 1342(a)(5).
48. Hande, supra note 5, at 409.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(2012).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (emphasis added).
51. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
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pollutant, which further supports a narrow interpretation of
pollutant.53
Second, a “point source” in the CWA is defined as “any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which
pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include
agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture.”54 Significantly, this definition gives an exemplary, but
not exhaustive, list of possible point sources. The only specificity
given is the exclusion sentence stating what is not included.
“[A]gricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from
irrigated agriculture”55 both fall under the separate category of
nonpoint source discharges and are delegated to the states to
regulate.56 However, the Supreme Court determined that in order
to be considered a point source, the sources do not have to actually
contribute the pollutants themselves to the body of water, but the
sources must merely be capable of transporting the pollutants.57
Lower courts have determined that dams and pumps are both
considered point sources.58 A river diversion would also be a
“discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which
pollutants are or may be discharged.”59
Third, “navigable waters” is used as a jurisdictional term,
defined as “waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas.”60 This is a broader meaning than the traditional notion that
navigable waters are those waters that are navigable in fact.61 For
example, in 1985 the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)
determined that wetlands that abut a navigable creek are protected
by the CWA.62 This is a reasonable interpretation because the
purpose of the CWA is to “restore and maintain the . . . integrity
of”63 the waters of the United States, and the best way to achieve
this is to also control all things that have a hydrologic connection
53. Id.
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
55. Id.
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2012).
57. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95,
105 (2004).
58. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165; Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 493 (2d Cir. 2001).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
61. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 167 (2001) (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 133 (1985)).
62. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 135.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
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with the navigable waters.64 The definition of “navigable waters”
continued to evolve, and in 2001 the Supreme Court introduced the
Significant Nexus Test.65 For an area to be considered part of the
waters of the United States, the area in question must have a
significant nexus to waters that are navigable in fact.66
The latest case to define “navigable waters” provided more
uncertainty than it did clarity. In Rapanos v. United States, the
Supreme Court faced the question of whether ditches and drains
near wetlands were “navigable waters” under the CWA.67 The
Court produced a 4-1-4 split decision with three different methods
of determination.68 Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion in
which the Court remanded the case to the Corps to determine
whether the ditches or drains near each wetland were waters of the
United States.69 In order to be included as “waters of the United
States,” the waters in question must be (1) relatively permanent,
standing, or continuously flowing, and (2) must have a continuous
surface connection to other regulated bodies of water.70 In the
concurrence, Justice Kennedy agreed with remanding the case to
the Corps to decide the factual question of whether the ditches or
drains were waters of the United States, but he also advocated a
broader definition of “navigable waters” to include all waterways
with an ecologically significant nexus.71 In Kennedy’s view, if a
waterway has a significant hydrological downstream effect on
navigable waters, it will be considered a navigable waterway under
the CWA.72 Kennedy also stated in his concurrence that he did not
support regulation based merely on speculation; instead, he
advocated that there should be a case-by-case analysis to determine
if there was actually a significant effect on downstream navigable
waters.73 Justice Kennedy criticized the plurality by claiming that
their definition would exclude seasonable rivers that dry up during
64. Because of this view, the Court required Section 404 permits for the
discharge of fill materials into a wetland in Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S.
at 139.
65. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 167 (holding that the deciding factor in
Riverside Bayview Homes was the significant nexus between the wetlands and
the navigable waters). Following this test, the Court found that ponds not
adjacent to navigable waters did not have a significant nexus to waters of the
United States and were not under the jurisdiction of the CWA. Id. at 172.
66. Id.
67. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
68. See id.
69. Id. at 757.
70. Id. at 742.
71. Id. at 786.
72. Id.
73. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 786.
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dry seasons and flow steady during the spring as a result of
snowmelt.74 In the dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court
should defer completely to the discretion of the Corps in
determining what is navigable and what is not as long as the
Corps’ decision supports the purpose of the CWA, which the Court
found it did.75
In any case, the Louisiana wetlands that lie directly adjacent to
both the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico would be
considered waters of the United States under all three
interpretations because the Louisiana wetlands lie adjacent to the
Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico, both of which are
navigable in fact and therefore waters of the United States.
Rapanos did not overturn the prior settled jurisprudence from
Riverside Bayview Homes, which held that wetlands that directly
abut navigable waters are also included under the jurisdiction of
the CWA.
Lastly, the term “addition” has stirred much debate mostly due
to the fact that the CWA does not define “addition.” Commentators
have identified two prevailing schools of thought concerning the
definition of an addition in the context of the CWA.76 Some
commentators argue in support of a traditional view while others
argue in support of the Unitary Waters Theory.77 The traditional
view takes the stance that the movement of pollutants from one
meaningfully distinct body of water to another is an addition.78 In
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, the Supreme Court, without deciding the validity of the
Unitary Waters Theory, remanded the case to the lower court to
determine as a preliminary matter, whether the two water bodies in
question were “meaningfully distinct.”79 Prior to that decision, in
National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, the plaintiffs urged the
D.C. Circuit to adopt the principle that “any adverse change in the
quality of reservoir water from its natural state involves a
‘pollutant’ and that release of polluted water through the [point
source] into the downstream river constitutes the ‘addition’ of a
pollutant to navigable waters ‘from’ a point source.”80 The
traditional approach can be summed up as follows: if the two water
74. Id. at 769–70. See also id. at 736 n.7.
75. Id. at 811–12.
76. Reagen, supra note 1, at 314.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 541 U.S. at 112 (remanded to determine if the water bodies at issue
were meaningfully distinct without deciding the validity of the Unitary Waters
Theory).
80. Hande, supra note 5, at 412 (quoting Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165).

2014]

COMMENT

269

bodies in question are determined to be meaningfully distinct, then
the transfer of any pollutant between them by means of a point
source requires an NPDES permit because that transfer constitutes
an “addition” of a pollutant from a point source. If the two water
bodies are determined not to be meaningfully distinct, no NPDES
permit is needed for any transfer of polluted water because there is
no “addition.”
Alternatively, the Unitary Waters Theory has a much narrower
interpretation of what qualifies as an “addition.” This theory was
first presented in Gorsuch, which questioned whether water that
passed through a dam and back into the same water body needed
an NPDES permit.81 All sides agreed that dams are point sources
within the definition provided in the CWA.82 The issue was
whether the effects of the dam constituted an “addition of
pollutants.”83 The EPA presented the view that an “addition” of a
pollutant only occurs if the point source itself introduces the
pollutant, and not if the point source simply transfers the pollutant
from one body of water to another.84 Hence, the introduction of a
pollutant into a water body is only an addition if it comes from the
outside world.85 Essentially, Unitary Waters proponents contend
that Congress intended that all waters within the borders of the
United States be treated as one big body of water.86 Ultimately, the
court held that the EPA’s interpretation that the alterations from
the dams were not pollutants under the NPDES permit program
was reasonable, so the question of what constituted an “addition”
was left unanswered.87
E. Limited Exclusions from NPDES Permits
Section 402 allows for some exceptions from NPDES permit
requirements. Under Section 318, the EPA has the authority to
allow the discharge of certain pollutants under certain conditions
when done as part of an aquaculture project.88 Also excepted are
permits issued under Section 404 of the CWA,89 which are
81. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174–75.
82. Id. at 165.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 175. The decision was two years before Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and hence the Court did
not refer to “Chevron deference.”
85. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165.
86. Hande, supra note 5, at 412.
87. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 182.
88. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2012).
89. See id.
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required for the discharge of dredged or fill material.90 The
separation of 402 and 404 permits is significant. Section 404
allows for the issuance of general permits, whereas Section 402
does not.91 More importantly, 404 permits fall under the
jurisdiction of the Corps92 and 402 permits fall under the
jurisdiction of the EPA.93 When the jurisdiction of the Corps is
invoked, there should also be an analysis of whether a Section 10
permit for the alteration of the navigability of a waterway is
needed.94 If a point source falls under the authority of the Corps
pursuant to a Section 10 permit, the CWA will not apply because
of the express prohibition in Section 511 of the CWA.95 Following
this progression, the issuance of a 404 permit could completely
preclude the requirement of an NPDES permit.
Other exclusions from NPDES permits include agricultural
return flows and stormwater runoff from oil, gas, and mining
operations.96 Under Section 208 of the CWA these nonpoint
sources are regulated according to area-wide waste treatment
management plans to be implemented by the states.97 The EPA’s
NPDES permitting system already faces a major limitation in that
the EPA cannot use Section 402 to override the plans set forth by
the states.98 The Water Transfers Rule adds another limitation by
exempting any pollutants discharged in water transfers.
F. Problems in the Louisiana Wetlands
The Mississippi River carries numerous pollutants in its waters.
Of primary concern are dangerously high concentrations of
phosphorus and nitrogen.99 These pollutants cause the annual dead
zone in the Gulf of Mexico by creating giant algae blooms.100 The
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e).
92. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(d).
93. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d).
94. Paul F. Foley, Missing the Point with Point-Source “Addition”
Semantics: Section 511 of the Clean Water Act Exempts Interconnected
Waterways from Section 402 Jurisdiction, Period?, 9 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.
65, 96 (2003).
95. Id. at 68.
96. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l) (2012).
97. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b).
98. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(e).
99. Jon Devine et al., Missing Protection: Polluting the Mississippi River
Basin’s Small Streams and Wetlands, NRDC ISSUE PAPER 6 (Oct. 2008),
http://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/msriver/fmsriver.pdf, archived at http://per
ma.cc/UK4Z-A4BU.
100. Id. at 4.
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algae blooms die off and decompose, taking all of the oxygen out
of the water.101 The dead zone has grown in size over the years. In
2008, the dead zone was measured at a size of 20,720 km2 or
roughly the size of the entire state of New Jersey.102 Contributing
to the expansion of the dead zone are the existing river diversions
in the Atchafalaya River basin.103 The shallow water of the basin’s
wetlands prevents the oxygen-depleted water from settling to the
bottom of the Gulf as it does at the mouth of the Mississippi.104
The dead zone leads to the death of fish and shellfish in the area or
their migration to other areas of the Gulf, which has a devastating
impact on the local economies of Louisiana. The dead zone costs
the United States’ economy an estimated $50 million a year.105
Unfortunately, the majority of the nitrogen and phosphorus
comes from upstream, outside of Louisiana’s borders.106 Nitrogen
and phosphorus are by-products of fertilizers and manure that
come from field runoff and discharge from sewage treatment
plants and industrial facilities, all of which are considered nonpoint
sources and qualify under Section 208 plans. Because of their
source, Louisiana is unable to regulate them in any meaningful
manner and cannot petition the EPA to regulate them because of
the nonpoint source exception.107 In fact, no federal enforcement
mechanism is in place to combat pollution coming from nonpoint
sources.108 Louisiana is in desperate need of an alternative method
to control the nitrogen and phosphorus levels in the Mississippi
River.
Recently, a lot of controversy has centered on Louisiana’s
Coastal Plan to rebuild and preserve the wetlands along the
Louisiana coast.109 The proposed plan calls for sediment diversions

101. Id.
102. Id. at 10–11.
103. Id. at 12.
104. Id.
105. Endre Szalay, Comment, Breathing Life into the Dead Zone: Can the
Federal Common Law of Nuisance Be Used To Control Nonpoint Source Water
Pollution?, 85 TUL. L. REV. 215, 220 (2010).
106. Devine, supra note 99, at 7–8.
107. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l) (2012).
108. Szalay, supra note 105, at 217.
109. See, e.g., Mark Schleifstein, Louisiana Coastal Scientists Say Criticism
of Plans to Build Large Sediment Diversions is Unfounded, THE TIMESPICAYUNE, Apr. 17, 2013, at 5pp; Todd Masson, Louisiana’s Coastal Master
Plan Will Destroy Fishing, Harm Coast, Opponents Say at Monday Meeting,
NOLA.COM (Apr. 30, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www.nola.com/outdoors/index
.ssf/2013/04/louisianas_coastal_master_plan.html; archived at http://perma.cc
/A3RM-K7E5.
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from the river into the marshes and wetlands of the state.110
Sediment diversions distribute sediment in addition to freshwater
in an attempt to rebuild land and combat saltwater intrusion to help
freshwater plant life grow.111 Opponents of the plan criticize the
diversions on the basis that the diversions will lead to more
pollutants in the wetlands.112 More nutrient pollution will lead to a
higher level of decomposition and loss of soil strength, which can
cause a deterioration of plant life and more land loss due to the
lack of a root system to hold the soil in place.113
II. CURRENT ISSUES
In 2008 the EPA promulgated the Water Transfers Rule, which
endangers the waterways of the United States by loosening
restrictions on discharging pollutants. The Water Transfers Rule
goes directly against the stated goals of the CWA and risks the
progress made since 1972 on cleaning the Nation’s waters. The
Eleventh Circuit made an egregious error when they granted
Chevron deference to the EPA on their impermissible
interpretation of the clear wording of the CWA.
A. EPA’s Water Transfers Rule of 2008 Goes Against the Stated
Goals of the CWA
The national goal of the CWA is to eliminate the “discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters.”114 Furthermore, the CWA
aims to provide “for the protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish, and wildlife and [provide] for recreation in and on the
water.”115 Significantly, Section 101 of the CWA explicitly states
that the Act should be used to control both point and nonpoint
sources of pollution.116 All three of these explicitly stated goals are
ignored in the EPA’s Water Transfers Rule.
110. Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast, LA.
COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH. 69 (2012), http://www.lacpra.org
/assets/docs/2012%20Master%20Plan/Final%20Plan/2012%20Coastal%20Mas
ter%20Plan.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3RW7-XSQL [hereinafter Master
Plan].
111. See generally J.M. TEAL ET AL., MISSISSIPPI RIVER FRESHWATER
DIVERSIONS IN SOUTHERN LOUISIANA: EFFECTS ON WETLAND VEGETATION,
SOILS, AND ELEVATION (A.J. Lewitus et al. eds., 2012).
112. Id. at 25.
113. Id.
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2012).
115. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7) (emphasis added).
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Under the first goal of the CWA, if one puts pollutants into a
body of water and increases the pollution levels of that water, then
that person has illegally discharged pollutants into the navigable
waters. However, the EPA’s Water Transfers Rule goes directly
against this clearly stated policy goal by allowing pollutants to
enter into a water body, adding to the pollution level of that water
body. The second goal is also in jeopardy. Allowing pollutants in
the Mississippi River to enter into the wetlands and the Gulf of
Mexico without a permit creates a dead zone that leads to the
death, or at best, a jubilee of the fish, shellfish and wildlife in the
waters.117 The Water Transfers Rule allows this activity without
regulation. The third goal was enacted in 1987 in response to the
failure of Section 208 to regulate nonpoint sources as intended.118
Nonpoint sources, as the most significant source of water
pollutants in the country, contribute more pollutants than point
sources.119 The Water Transfers Rule perpetuates the already
absent control over nonpoint source pollutants by allowing them to
pass through point sources without regulation. The three goals
mentioned above, and the failure of the Water Transfers Rule to
adhere to them, highlight the need to strengthen the NPDES
program, not weaken it.
1. The Beginning: The Unitary Waters Theory
The Water Transfers Rule evolved from the Unitary Waters
Theory, which holds that all waters within the borders of the
United States are considered to be one big body of water.120 Prior
to any formal enactment, the courts uniformly rejected the Unitary
Waters Theory. The theory is based on the wording of the
definition of “discharge of pollutants” which says it is “any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.”121 The use of “navigable waters” as opposed to “any
navigable waters” is the focal point of the argument the EPA put
forth in South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians.122 This was the same argument put forward in
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New
117. A jubilee is the phenomenon where fish and shrimp flee hypoxic water
created by the dead zone in large numbers in order to escape suffocation. See
Szalay, supra note 105, at 244.
118. Szalay, supra note 105, at 239.
119. Tran-Caffee, supra note 43, at 757.
120. Hande, supra note 5, at 403.
121. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2012).
122. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95,
105–06 (2004).
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York (Catskill I)123 and again in Catskill II.124 In all three instances,
the argument failed.
In Miccosukee, the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the
Unitary Waters Theory because it was not advanced at the
appellate level.125 However, the Court criticized the theory on the
grounds that the CWA does not exempt nonpoint sources from
NPDES permitting when those sources also qualify as point
sources.126 The Court further criticized the theory by pointing to
several other provisions of the NPDES that suggest the permits are
meant to protect individual bodies of water as well as the waters of
the United States as a whole.127 Because the issue was not raised,
however, the Court left the question over the validity of the
Unitary Waters Theory open to the Eleventh Circuit on remand.128
In Catskill I the Second Circuit considered the Unitary Waters
Theory under the “one pot” analogy.129 This analogy explains that
if a person uses a ladle to spoon some soup out of a pot and then
pours the same soup back into the same pot, nothing has been
“added” to the pot.130 The Second Circuit refused to apply Chevron
deference and, just as the Supreme Court did, criticized the EPA
for never formalizing the Unitary Waters Theory in a notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication.131 The Second Circuit
instead examined the theory under the Mead standard.132 Finding
the Unitary Waters Theory unpersuasive, the court refused to grant
deference.133 The court criticized the theory by stating that “[n]o
one can reasonably argue that the water in the Reservoir and the
[creek] are in any sense the ‘same,’ such that ‘addition’ of one to

123. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited Inc. v. City of New
York (Catskill I), 273 F.3d 481, 489–90 (2d Cir. 2001).
124. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New
York (Catskill II), 451 F.3d 77, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2006).
125. Miccosukee, 541 U.S., at 109.
126. Id. at 106.
127. Id. at 107.
128. Id. at 109. On remand, the case was dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.
See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 559 F.3d 1191
(11th Cir. 2009).
129. Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 492.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 489–90.
132. Id. at 491 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235
(2001)). Mead deference requires the court to grant deference to an agency
position only to the extent it is persuasive when the agency has not adopted the
position in a rulemaking or other formal position.
133. Id.
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the other is a logical impossibility.”134 The EPA responded to the
criticism by publishing its 2005 Interpretation Paper.135
2. EPA Responds: 2005 EPA Interpretation Paper
In the EPA’s 2005 Interpretation Paper, the Agency considered
the question to be “whether movement of pollutants from one
navigable water to another by a water transfer is the ‘addition’ of a
pollutant potentially subjecting the activity to the permitting
requirement under Section 402 of the Act.”136 The EPA focused its
discussion on the balance between state and federal responsibility
for water monitoring and used statutory and historical
interpretations while noting that there had been no previous formal
statement by the EPA on the issue.137
Under its statutory interpretation, the EPA first considered the
statute as a whole and noted that absurd results should be
avoided.138 The EPA then argued that the overriding direction of
the CWA is to not interfere with states’ water allocations and that
it was Congress’ intent to leave nonpoint source pollution control
to the states.139 The EPA found it was reasonable to interpret
“addition” in Section 402 to not include transfers because
Congress intended to control pollutants at the initial source instead
of waiting until after they are already in the waters of the United
States.140
Regarding individual case evaluations, the EPA’s
Interpretation Paper first stated that a case-by-case analysis should
be avoided altogether, but if individual analyses are needed, the
“meaningfully distinct” test should be used narrowly in a two-step
process.141 The first step examines whether the water bodies in the
transfer are distinct. If the water bodies are or ever have been part
of the same, they are not distinct.142 A full evaluation of the
134. Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
135. Letter from Ann R. Klee, Gen. Counsel, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to
Regional Admin. (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/ogc/docu
ments/water_transfers.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M2VJ-7D33[hereinafter
Agency Interpretation].
136. Id. at 2.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 4–5 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d
91, 98 (2d Cir. 2001)).
139. Id. at 6–7. But see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 406 U.S. 91, 102
(1972) (holding federal law should control pollution of interstate waters as
opposed to state law).
140. Id. at 7–8.
141. Agency Interpretation, supra note 135, at 15.
142. Id. at 16.
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hydrological connection between the two bodies of water should
be conducted, including both man-made conveyances, such as a
pump, and natural conveyances.143 If the two water bodies are
determined to be distinct, the second step examines whether the
distinct water bodies are meaningfully distinct. This analysis
essentially focuses on environmentally significant interactions
between the two. The EPA stated the “specific context of the
transfer should be evaluated to determine whether the transfer
would have a substantial adverse impact on the receiving water
body [sic].”144 The Interpretation Paper concluded by stating that it
was the EPA’s stance that Congress intended water transfers to not
be regulated by Section 402 permits, but rather by the states and
that the EPA intends to initiate a rule making process.145
Following the Interpretation Paper, the Second Circuit heard
Catskill II. Rejecting the Unitary Waters Theory again, the Second
Circuit relied on Miccosukee and stated that the Supreme Court
implied that “at least in the context of the CWA, the unitary water
theory has no place.”146 The court also considered arguments by
the EPA, labeled “holistic arguments,” that objected to interference
with the allocation of rights and responsibilities between the EPA
and the states regarding states’ rights to allocate their own water.
The court rejected this argument just as it did in Catskill I.147 In
Catskill II the Second Circuit applied the plain language of the
statute to conclude, contrary to the EPA’s assertion, that the
Unitary Waters Theory was not consistent with Congress’ intent in
the CWA.148
3. EPA Promulgates a Rule: Water Transfers Rule
The final rule issued by the EPA explains that a “[w]ater
transfer means an activity that conveys or connects waters of the
United States without subjecting the transferred water to
intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial use.”149 The EPA

143. Id.
144. Id. at 18.
145. Id. at 19.
146. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited Inc. v. City of New
York (Catskill II), 451 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing S. Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105–09 (2004)).
147. Id. at 83–84.
148. Id. at 84–85.
149. 40 C.F.R. §122.3(i) (2013).
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states that water transfers do not require NPDES permits because
there is no “addition” of a pollutant.150
In explaining its rationale for this rule, the EPA begins by
explaining the legal framework for its rule and then examines the
statutory language and the legislative history of the CWA. As the
Eleventh Circuit stated, because the EPA had promulgated a rule,
any judicial review now had to be done under the Chevron test.151
The EPA concedes that the term “addition” has been interpreted by
some courts as being the transfer of water from one meaningfully
distinct body of water to another.152 However, the EPA relies on
other courts’ interpretations that a pollutant must come from the
outside world and merely passing through a point source such as a
dam or a pump does not require regulation under the NPDES.153
These courts, however, were interpreting the use of the word
“addition” very narrowly. For instance, in Gorsuch, the D.C.
Circuit decided to limit the term “addition” to a situation where a
dam was putting water back into the same water body that it came
from.154 It is important to note that because a dam can be
considered a point source,155 it logically follows that point sources
do not necessarily have to divide two “meaningfully distinct water
bodies.”156 For example, a dam in the middle of a river does not
make the river two distinct bodies of water.157 Once the point
source introduces a pollutant, it then becomes an “addition” and is
subject to NPDES permitting.158 It is unlikely the D.C. Circuit
would have excluded the dam from permitting had water been
150. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water
Transfer Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33699 (proposed June 27, 2008) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
151. Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210,
1218 (11th Cir. 2009).
152. See NPDES Water Transfer Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33699 (June 13,
2008).
153. Id.
154. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156,175 (D.C. Cir. 1982) The
water was flowing from the reservoir, through the dam, into the downstream
river that was being dammed up to begin with.
155. Id. at 165.
156. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95,
112 (2004).
157. See Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d
1210, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009). (discussing why Gorsuch did not decide the issue
of what constitutes an “addition”). The court also explained why Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988), the other case
relied upon by the EPA in its rule, did not decide the issue of transferring
pollutants between distinct water bodies either. Friends of the Everglades, 570
F.3d at 1220–21.
158. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d, at 174–75.
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taken from the dam and transported to another, separate river, yet
this is exactly what the EPA is contending in its Water Transfers
Rule.
The EPA goes on to explain that in statutory interpretation,
statutes should be interpreted as a whole to determine their purpose
and intent and yet, astoundingly, the EPA is still able to conclude
that Congress intended a narrow view of the term “addition” in the
definition of “discharge of pollutants.”159 Remember Section 101
of the CWA states that the goal is to control both point and
nonpoint sources of pollution,160 and further, the goal is to
eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters.161 The
EPA justifies their radical view by arguing that Congress’ primary
intent was to maintain a balance between federal and state control
over waterways and that this concern should take precedent over
the other explicit goals of the CWA.162 While this is a concern of
the CWA, it is hardly the primary concern given the move since
1961 towards more federal involvement.163 Also, as the Second
Circuit stated, “the CWA balances a welter of consistent and
inconsistent goals. In contrast with [this concern], the CWA also
expressly includes a broad and uncompromising policy of
‘restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.’”164 Further, the court stated that,
“[w]here a statute seeks to balance competing policies,
congressional intent is not served by elevating one policy above
the others, particularly where the balance struck in the text is
sufficiently clear to point to an answer.”165 Nevertheless, after a
short analysis of the legislative history of the CWA, the Water
Transfers Rule concludes, as it did in its statutory analysis, that
Congress intended to leave more power with the states to control
water pollution in order to avoid duplicative legislation in the
states that already had control over water transfers.166
B. Enter the Eleventh Circuit.
Very shortly after the EPA promulgated its Water Transfers
Rule the Eleventh Circuit heard Friends of the Everglades v. South
159. NPDES Water Transfer Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 33697, 33701 (2013).
160. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7) (2012).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
162. 73 Fed. Reg. at 33701.
163. See Murchison, supra note 7, at 532.
164. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New
York (Catskill I), 273 F.3d 481, 494 (2d Cir. 2001).
165. Id.
166. 73 Fed. Reg. at 33702 (2013).
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Florida Water Management District to determine whether the
Water Transfers Rule applies to water transfers from polluted
canals in South Florida to Lake Okeechobee.167 The situation in
Friends of the Everglades is markedly similar to the circumstances
occurring in southern Louisiana. In southern Florida water flow is
controlled by a system of canals and pump stations similar to that
in Louisiana.168 The Everglades swamp lies to the south of Lake
Okeechobee where a series of canals were dug to help drain runoff
from sugar cane fields.169 These canals carry chemicals such as
nitrogen and phosphorus and have low oxygen content.170 Pumps
are used to transfer the polluted water in the canals uphill into Lake
Okeechobee, which is used for recreational activities.171 As noted
in the opinion, these pumps do not add any pollutants into the
water, but merely transfer it from one water body to another
through pipes.172
The Eleventh Circuit started its discussion by considering the
necessary elements for requiring a permit and establishing what
was present and what was missing.173 There needed to be an
“addition of any pollutants to navigable waters from any point
source.”174 Nitrogen, phosphorus, low oxygen, and other chemicals
in the water all qualified as pollutants.175 Lake Okeechobee was a
navigable waterway and the pumps were point sources.176 The only
remaining question was whether there was an “addition” by
moving the pollutants from one navigable waterway to another.177
The District Court decided this was an addition.178 However, this
decision came before the EPA promulgated the Water Transfers
Rule.
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the District Court’s opinion
under a newly promulgated rule and had to decide how much
deference to grant that rule. Before going into a discussion of
Chevron deference, the court summarized the Unitary Waters Rule
and its widespread failure in the courts, including the Eleventh
167. Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210
(11th Cir. 2009).
168. Id. at 1214.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1214.
173. Id. at 1216.
174. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2012).
175. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1216.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1217.
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Circuit itself.179 However, as the court pointed out, prior
interpretations do not matter under Chevron; all that matters is that
the agency provides a “reasonable construction of an ambiguous
statute.”180 The issue to be decided was whether the word
“addition,” as used in Section 402, was ambiguous. The court
examined “the text of the statute, its structure, and its stated
purpose.”181 On one side, “addition to the waters of the United
States” refers to the waters as one unit (all the rivers, lakes,
streams, canals, etc. of the United States are all the same water).182
Alternatively, “addition to the waters of the United States” means
additions to one discrete body of water from another separate and
discrete body of water.183 The court held that the absence of the
word “any” before “navigable waters” created ambiguity because it
is present in other instances throughout the CWA, including the
same section at issue.184 The court further held that examining the
statute as a whole did not alleviate any of the ambiguity.185 The
court relied on the fact that other provisions in the Act seemed
contrary to the stated purpose of the statute as a whole.186
Essentially, the court’s rationale was that because other parts of the
statute may be questionable, this part must be questionable as well.
Because the court held the statute to be ambiguous, it turned
next to whether the EPA’s interpretation of the statute was
reasonable. The court attempted to solve the problem through a
simple hypothetical involving marbles and buckets where the
marbles represented pollution and the buckets represented bodies
of water.187 The court framed the hypothetical this way:
Two buckets sit side by side, one with four marbles in it
and the other with none. There is a rule prohibiting “any
addition of any marbles to buckets by any person.” A
person comes along, picks up two marbles from the first
bucket, and drops them into the second bucket. Has the
marble-mover “add[ed] any marbles to buckets”?188

179. Id. at 1217–18.
180. Id. at 1219.
181. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Miami-Dade Cnty.
v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1049, 1063 (11th Cir. 2008)).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1224–25.
185. Id. at 1225.
186. Id. at 1227.
187. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1228.
188. Id.
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When phrased in this simplistic and isolated language, it is
possible to see some ambiguity. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
granted the EPA’s Water Transfers Rule deference under Chevron,
finding it to be a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute.189
III. WHY THE WATER TRANSFERS RULE FAILS
The Eleventh Circuit erred in granting the EPA’s Water
Transfer Rule Chevron deference. Under the Chevron analysis, the
first step is to determine if the language of the enabling statute is
clear and unambiguous.190 If the language of the statute is clear as
to the intent of Congress, then that is the end of the discussion.191
If the language is ambiguous, however, the court next must
determine not what the best interpretation of the statute is, but
rather whether the interpretation adopted by the regulating agency
is permissible.192 The Eleventh Circuit erred when it said the
language of the statute was ambiguous. The language of the statute
is clear; any alternative interpretation exceeds the statutory
authority Congress granted the EPA under the CWA. Further, even
if there were ambiguity in the language of the statute, the Water
Transfers Rule would still fail. The EPA’s interpretation of the rule
is not permissible because it goes against the stated policy of the
CWA.
A. The Statutory Language is Clear and Unambiguous
In the case of 402 permits, the language is “sufficiently clear to
point to an answer.”193 Permits are required for the “discharge of
any pollutant” into the waters of the United States.194 “Discharge
of any pollutant” is defined in the context of the CWA as “any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.”195 This language is clear. The EPA’s interpretation
perverts the common understanding of the word “addition.”196 The
Eleventh Circuit’s misguided attempt to break down the issue into
a simplistic analogy of marbles and buckets fails for the simple
reason that pollutants are not marbles and the water bodies of the
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
Id. at 843.
Id.
Catskill I, 273 F.3d 481, 494 (2d Cir. 2001).
33 U.S.C. § 1342(1) (2012).
33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
Reagen, supra note 1, at 321–22.
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United States are not buckets. In the court’s analogy, marbles are
seen exactly as they are: neutral, innocuous items. If the rule is that
no marbles can be added to buckets, the rule seems completely
arbitrary and without meaning because marbles have no negative
characteristics. In reality, however, the discussion is not about
marbles. It is about toxic pollutants that kill plant and animal life
and cost the country millions of dollars in damage every year.
A better hypothetical would be to say that the marbles are toxic
and when they come into contact with the buckets, the
contamination requires an expensive and resource-exhausting
process to remove them from the buckets and restore the buckets to
their original state. Phrased this way, it is clear that the purpose of
the “no addition of any marbles rule” is to keep as many buckets
free of marbles as possible. Putting additional marbles in a bucket
undeniably goes against the clear intent of the rule.
Further, as other commentators have suggested, the term
“navigable waters” is nothing more than a jurisdictional term used
to define where the EPA has authority.197 As Reagen points out,
the Friends of the Everglades court incorrectly focused on the
absence of a word instead of what was actually there.198 The court
should have focused on where the term “any” is used.199 The
statute explicitly states that the discharge of a pollutant is “any
addition . . . ”200 This shows Congress’ obvious intent for a broad
interpretation of the word addition. “[A]ny addition” clearly means
a permit is required for anything added to a body of “navigable
water.”201 Even looking solely at the term “navigable waters,” the
court again ignored what is actually there and focused on what is
not. Congress did not use the singular term, “navigable water,” but
rather the plural, “waters.”202 The use of the plural form makes it
clear Congress is not referring to “one unitary body of water,” but
multiple distinct bodies of water.
The court also ignored another significant part of the statute. In
Section 101(g) of the CWA, Congress explicitly used the term
“reduce” in setting the policy of the CWA.203 The use of the word
“reduce” is more indicative of congressional intent than the
absence of a word, just as congressional action is more indicative
197. Id. at 323.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2012).
201. Reagen, supra note 1, at 323.
202. Hande, supra note 5, at 432.
203. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (setting the policy that Federal, State and Local
agencies should cooperate to “prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution”).
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than Congress’ failure to act.204 Transferring water that contains
pollutants from one body of water to another distinct body of water
is certainly not a reduction of pollution. It is an addition of
pollutants to the receiving body of water that requires an NPDES
permit.205
B. EPA’s Water Transfers Rule is Untenable in Light of the CWA.
Even accepting ambiguity in the statute, the EPA’s
interpretation is untenable when considered with the overriding
policy and purpose of the CWA. In its 2005 Interpretation Paper,
the EPA focused on Section 101(g), which states that it is
Congress’ further intent to “prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution in concert with programs managing water sources.”206
The EPA interprets this as focusing on Congress’ intent to leave
nonpoint source pollution control to the states.207 This is a valid
point and is reinforced by the legislative history of the 1972 Act,
stating that “[i]t is the Committee’s intent to restore the balance of
Federal-State effort in the program.”208 However, the Senate
Report also states that “[t]he Federal Government as the custodian
of the navigable waters has the responsibility to control
affirmatively any discharges of pollutants into the navigable
waters.”209 The report goes on to mention that the intent is for
states to implement their own permitting program,210 and once that
is accomplished and approved by the EPA, then and only then
should the Federal Government hand over control of discharges to
the states. “If the Administrator finds that a State program is
inadequate to mitigate his involvement he should not approve a
State program.”211 By the EPA’s own account, as of 2005, only
Pennsylvania had implemented NPDES permits for transfers from
one body of water to another.212 Logic would suggest that the EPA
should still be charged with regulating the discharges of pollutants
from point sources. Regulation is not a state issue until a state
204. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 137
(1985).
205. Reagen, supra note 1, at 326–27 (quoting Catskill Mountains Chapter of
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 491 (2d Cir. 2006)
(Catskill I)).
206. Agency Interpretation, supra note 135, at 5–6.
207. Id. at 5–7.
208. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3675.
209. Id. at 3737.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Agency Interpretation, supra note 135, at 4 n.6.
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presents an approved NPDES system of its own for regulation.
State responsibility is limited to nonpoint sources of pollutants and
transfers are not nonpoint sources.213
The EPA’s reliance on Section 101(g) is further flawed in that
it was enacted as part of the Amendments in 1977. The Senate
Report states that “the overall thrust and objectives of the program
should not be abandoned, and . . . the correction required is modest
at best.”214 The “overall thrust and objective” of the CWA is to
“restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”215 Allowing a point source to
discharge pollutants into a navigable waterway would abandon that
objective, and any interpretation leading to such a conclusion is
untenable. Accepting, ad arguendo, the notion that all waters of
the United States are a unitary whole would still allow the
movement of pollutants around the system, which does nothing to
“restore” the integrity of the Nation’s waters. This result is an
absurd conclusion and must be dismissed as impermissible.
From a jurisprudential standpoint, the very argument upon
which the Water Transfers Rule is based failed time and time again
prior to the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling. The Second Circuit explicitly
stated that the idea that two separate bodies of water could be
considered the same so as to prevent any addition was
unreasonable.216 The Supreme Court of the United States called the
idea that permits are only required when pollutants originate in
point sources “untenable.”217 Even the EPA’s own Interpretation
Paper offers a contradiction of the Water Transfers Rule. In a
footnote at the end of its paper, the EPA states that discharges of
pollutants include point sources that do not generate pollutants
themselves.218 Because point sources are regulated by Section 402,
and transfers are point sources, they too would fall under Section
402 and require NPDES permits when they discharge pollutants
into a navigable water body. A theory that the courts called both
“unreasonable” and “untenable” cannot pass the Chevron test for
deference.

213. See, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. at 105; Catskill I, 273
F.3d at 493; Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165.
214. S. Rep. No. 95-370 at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326,
4328.
215. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
216. Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 492.
217. Reagen, supra note 1, at 325–26.
218. Agency Interpretation, supra note 135, at 19 n.20.
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C. The Water Transfers Rule Fails to Protect the Louisiana
Wetlands
Current EPA guidelines have failed to solve the problems of
coastal land loss and the dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico.
Currently, states in the Mississippi River basin have no numerical
water quality standards for phosphorus in rivers or streams or for
nitrogen in any waters.219 Additionally, most states do not attempt
to limit nitrogen and phosphorus discharges in NPDES permits.220
Louisiana is now moving forward with plans to open a new
diversion from the Mississippi River into the Louisiana wetlands.
The Mid-Barataria diversion is scheduled to open in 2015 through
funding provided by the BP payments.221 This diversion, only one
of ten proposed, would pump up to 250,000 cubic feet per second
of water and sediment from the Mississippi River into the
wetlands, along with all the nitrogen and phosphorus contained in
the water.222 In fact, the proposed diversions have the capacity to
pump 50% of the Mississippi River’s water into the wetlands.223
Without regulation, these diversions could end up pumping
polluted water into the wetlands at an unfettered rate.
Courts are recognizing the need for federal involvement in
nonpoint source pollution control. Environmentalists recently won
a small victory in the Eastern District of Louisiana.224 The Gulf
Restoration Network (GRN) requested that the EPA establish
numeric water quality standards for the Gulf waters outside of state
control and all waterways in states that do not already have
numeric water quality standards. The EPA refused to do so and did
not state a reason why.225 The GRN relied on Section 303(c)(4) of
the CWA, which states “in any case where the Administrator
determines that a revised or new standard is necessary to meet the
requirements of this chapter,” the Administrator “shall promptly
prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth a revised or
new water quality standard for the navigable waters involved.”226
Judge Zainey recognized the need for a federal role and ordered
219. Gulf Restoration Network v. Jackson, No. 12-677, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 134811, at *8 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 2013).
220. Id. at *8.
221. Mark Shleifstein, Louisiana could begin building Mid-Barataria
sediment diversion by late 2015, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 19, 2013, at 6pp.
222. Master Plan, supra note 110 at 134.
223. Id. at 150.
224. Gulf Restoration Network, No. 12-677, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134811,
at *31. This decision is currently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
225. Id. at 10–14.
226. Id. at 9.
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the EPA to respond to the GRN’s petition by conducting a
necessity determination for new numerical water quality
standards.227
The wetlands are a meaningfully distinct body of water under
the Significant Nexus Test from Riverside Bayview Homes.228
Some opponents of this position argue that but for the man-made
levees and flood protection structures, the Mississippi River would
naturally flow into the wetlands and disperse its water and sediment
throughout the wetlands and the distributaries within. While it is true
that the river would flow into the wetlands naturally, the wetlands
currently should be considered meaningfully distinct from the
Mississippi. “During the past two centuries the hydrology of the
distributary zone was totally modified by the construction of flood
levees and closing of key distributaries . . . . These structures
isolated the river from its delta, causing an ongoing catastrophic
collapse in the deltaic landscape, primarily wetlands.”229 Instead of
regulating the wetlands under the conditions from 200 years ago, it
makes more sense to regulate the wetlands based on their current
condition.
Because the wetlands are meaningfully distinct, the Eastern
District’s ruling would also require establishing numerical water
quality standards for the wetlands. If these established standards
cannot be met through BAT, the EPA must then establish TMDLs
for the wetlands. In order for any discharge of pollutants into the
wetlands, the point source discharging the pollutants would require
an NPDES permit to ensure that the TMDLs are met for the
wetlands.
However, the Water Transfers Rule means that Louisiana can
no longer rely on NPDES permits to help combat the spread of
pollution into the wetlands through diversions.230 The Rule allows
northern states to contribute significantly more pollutants into the
Mississippi River through simple transfers with no consequences
for doing so. Louisiana, however, will deal with the consequences
in the form of a more highly polluted Mississippi River that will
exacerbate the growth of the Gulf dead zone every year. Through
227. Id. at 30–31.
228. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139
(1985).
229. MISSISSIPPI RIVER/GULF OF MEXICO WATERSHED NUTRIENT TASK
FORCE, GULF HYPOXIA ACTION PLAN 2008 FOR REDUCING, MITIGATING, AND
CONTROLLING HYPOXIA IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF MEXICO AND IMPROVING
WATER QUALITY IN THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER BASIN 3 (2008), available at
http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/named/msbasin/upload/2008_8_28_msbasin
_ghap2008_update082608.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GM9C-GCD7.
230. Reagen, supra note 1, at 324.
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the diversions, these pollutants will invade the wetlands and
degrade the plant life by a loss of soil strength. With weakened soil
strength, plants are more vulnerable to storms and will become
uprooted more easily. Additionally, the loss of the wetlands will
endanger the livelihood of the fisherman who depend upon them as
well as the communities that live further inland. The Water
Transfers Rule weakens Louisiana’s ability to protect its waters
from pollution and prevents the NPDES program from protecting
downstream states from out-of-state pollution that is beyond their
control.231 State nonpoint source regulations, Section 208 permits,
do not protect Louisiana. As one commentator stated, “[A] welldesigned monitoring program is essential to assess whether
diversions are promoting marsh sustainability and to support
adaptive management of diversions.”232
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Given the complexity of managing the Nation’s waters and the
differing needs in each region, it is impossible to perfectly cater to
each region’s needs with one solution. Likely, each region will
need an individualized solution, but it is possible to come up with a
general framework for each region to alter based on that region’s
specific needs and concerns. This Comment considers one
proposed solution of a General Permit System designed for the
problems in the western states and offers another solution that is
more applicable to the country as a whole.
A. General Permit Systems
The western United States depends on a complex system of
water transfers to get water to urban areas as well as agricultural
zones that need water for irrigation.233 Often these transfers carry
water across state lines. Without uniform, federal NPDES
standards in place, there could be different standards for different
sections of the same transfer. Having to meet different standards
along the way will increase the cost of the transfer system as well
as make the transfer incredibly inefficient.
Reagen proposed a General Permit System that would cover all
discharges for a single body of water or all point sources in a

231. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 777 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
232. TEAL ET AL., supra note 111, at 29.
233. Reagen, supra note 1, at 330.
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complex diversion system, such as those out west.234 A general
permit system would balance the feasibility and efficiency sought
in water pollution control with actual protection of waters.235 It
would also solve the problem of the expensive permitting process
for some of the diversions, such as the Colorado-Big Thompson
Project, which would cost over $315 million in permit fees—more
than twice the cost of the project itself.236 A General Permit
System would also reduce paperwork and create an easily
administered pollution control system.237
However, this system does not solve the problems in
Louisiana. Louisiana has an even more complicated system of
waterways that lead to the wetlands and the Gulf. Considering all
of these as a single body of water as would be necessary under a
general permitting system would over-simplify the matter. History
has shown that it is not always easy to determine what qualifies as
a navigable waterway and what does not.238 Issuing one general
permit for the entire system of Louisiana wetlands would open the
possibility of some sources contributing a disproportionate amount
of pollutants, resulting in highly vulnerable weak links in the
wetlands. Adding to the complexity, some of these sources may be
underground and out of sight.239 In sum, these general permit
systems would not provide the same protection that individual
NPDES permits would.
B. Water Quality Credit Trading Program
“Water Quality Trading is an innovative, market-based
approach that if used in certain watersheds can achieve water
quality standards more efficiently and at [a] lower cost than
traditional approaches.”240 Water Quality Trading Programs
234. Id. at 336.
235. Id. at 329.
236. Id. at 331–32.
237. Id. at 336.
238. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (in which the
Court split 4-1-4, giving no rule on how to determine what waters fall under the
CWA).
239. Kari Dequine Hardin, New research: Ancient bayous pull water from the
Mississippi, creating ‘missing river’, THELENSNOLA.ORG (Sept. 5, 2013, 2:49
PM), http://thelensnola.org/2013/09/05/new-research-ancient-bayous-pull-waterfrom-the-mississippi-creating-missing-river/, archived at http://perma.cc/Q3KJWJR9.
240. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF WASTEWATER MGMT, PERMITS
DIVISION, No. 833-R-07-004, WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT FOR PERMIT
WRITERS 4 (June 2009) [hereinafter TOOLKIT], available at http://permanent
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(WQTPs) allow point sources, subject to NPDES permits, to
purchase credits from upstream nonpoint sources to ease their cost
of meeting the TMDLs for the body of water.241 It is often cheaper
for upstream nonpoint sources to implement controls over
agricultural discharges than it is to control them later downstream at
a single point source. The purchasing of credits allows point source
permit-holders to lower their cost substantially while still
maintaining pollution concentrations below the TMDLs established
for the body of water.
Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable
Coast from 2012 (Master Plan) makes it clear that in Louisiana’s
view, it is “no longer a question of whether we will do large scale
diversions, but how we will do them.”242 The Master Plan focuses
on sediment diversions as opposed to freshwater diversions because
the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority views sediment
diversions as “essential to sustaining coastal Louisiana.”243 Because
it seems apparent that sediment diversions are inevitable at this
point, it is essential to design a program that incorporates them into
real reductions of pollutants in the wetlands.
Establishing a WQTP for the entire Mississippi River valley
would benefit all states that lie along the Mississippi River and that
have tributaries to the Mississippi. Under the proposed program, all
states would work together to establish a joint association to monitor
a credit exchange for nonpoint sources to sell their credits and point
sources to purchase credits. Indeed, the CWA even encourages the
establishment of such an exchange.244
In a credit exchange the nonpoint sources will generate
pollutant load reductions using best management practices (BMPs)
that go beyond their required reductions. These excess reductions
can be sold as credits to the exchanges. The exchanges will then
sell the credits to point sources for less than what it would cost the
point sources to meet their water quality based effluent limits
(WQBELs). These exchanges can be regulated by the EPA or

.access.gpo.gov/LPS113622/LPS113622/www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/wqtradingtool
kit.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JA66-9QST.
241. Id.
242. Master Plan, supra note 110, at 150.
243. Id. at 106.
244. 33 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (2012). (“The Administrator shall encourage
cooperative activities by the States for the prevention, reduction, and elimination
of pollution, encourage the enactment of improved and, so far as practicable,
uniform State laws relating to the prevention, reduction, and elimination of
pollution; and encourage compacts between States for the prevention and control
of pollution.”).
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vicariously by the association established by the states. The price
of the credits and the ratio of how much pollution reduction will
constitute a credit can be established by the newly created
association as well.245
It is important for the EPA to consider a WQTP when
establishing TMDLs for the Mississippi River and the wetlands.
Given the recent Gulf Restoration Network decision from the
Eastern District, it is probable the EPA will need to reestablish new
effluent limits for the Mississippi River and subsequent TMDLs.246
A Trading Program should be considered when establishing these
new limits.247
Another important point is that the Credit Trading Program is
not a substitute for the NPDES permits. The TMDLs and the
NPDES permits are essential for the success of the Trading
Program because they will act as the market drivers by creating a
demand for the credits.248 Without the permit requirements, the
diversions will not have any reason to purchase the credits and
subsequently the nonpoint sources further up the river will not
have any reason to reduce their emissions with BMPs. The
ultimate goal is to reduce the nutrient pollution in the Mississippi
River in order to prevent an influx of harmful nitrogen and
phosphorus into the wetlands.
This solution also addresses the issue of the states maintaining
control over their own water regulation because the nonpoint
source regulation under Section 208 will still be left to the states.
Further, every state along the Mississippi River already regulates
its own NPDES permits.249 This solution allows states to maintain
control over their water regulation while working with other states
to produce desirable results for all states involved. The upriver
states benefit in that their farmers can cheaply reduce their
emissions with BMPs and then sell the generated credits for a
profit. The downstream states benefit in that their point source
permit holders can meet their permit limits by purchasing the
credits for less than it would cost them to implement the reductions
themselves. NPDES permit holders will still need to meet the
245. A full discussion of how the credit ratios can be established is beyond
the scope of this paper, but see generally TOOLKIT, supra note 240.
246. See Gulf Restoration Network v. Jackson, No. 12-677, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 134811 (E.D. La. Sept. 20, 2013).
247. TOOLKIT, supra note 240, at 20.
248. Id. at 8.
249. National Pollution Discharge Elimination System: Specific State
Program Status, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes
/basics/NPDES-State-Program-Status.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc /V9682VGB (last updated Sept. 9, 2014).
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required Technology Based Effluent Limits (TBELs) that are
imposed on all point sources. Again, the Trading Program is not an
end-run around responsibility for pollution emissions. The Trading
Program is simply a means for point sources to achieve their
established WQBEL when the TBELs fall short.
A WQTP could work for the western states as well; the entire
Colorado-Big Thompson system could be governed by one trading
association if all of the states are willing to work together. A
WQTP also addresses the concern of costs by helping to regulate
pollution in a cost-effective manner, thereby reducing the cost for
everyone involved.
Establishing TMDLs for the Louisiana wetlands as
meaningfully distinct bodies of water would require NPDES
permits for any diversion that wishes to discharge pollutants from
the Mississippi River. Because the diversions would need NPDES
permits to meet the TMDLs, these point sources would be able to
purchase credits from upstream nonpoint sources, shifting the
burden of reducing the pollutants to the actual sources of those
pollutants. Nitrogen and phosphorus concentrations will fall in the
Mississippi River, and subsequently, fewer pollutants will flow
into the wetlands. Obtaining an NPDES permit will be easier and
cheaper for the proposed diversions because of the WQTPs. This
solution produces a cost-effective way of producing real results
and maintaining the health and integrity of the Nation’s waters.
CONCLUSION
Instead of protecting the waters of the United States, the EPA
put them in danger with the promulgation of the Water Transfers
Rule. Allowing highly polluted water to enter clean water suitable
for drinking through the simple use of a transfer is an abomination
of the purpose and intent of the CWA. “If an ‘addition . . . to
navigable waters’ occurs only at a pollutant’s first entry into
navigable waters, and never again when it is transferred to a
different water body, then the NPDES program—the centerpiece
of the Clean Water Act—would require no permit for a project to
pump the most loathsome navigable water in the country into the
most pristine one.”250 Even with this statement, the Eleventh
Circuit erroneously gave deference to the Water Transfers Rule.
The Water Transfers Rule fails the Chevron test for deference
because the wording of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The
absence of the word “any” before “navigable waters” is
250. Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210,
1226 (11th Cir. 2009).
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inconsequential. As pointed out, “navigable waters” is a
jurisdictional term and should not be over-analyzed. The
substantive words of the statute are “any addition of any pollutant . . .
from any point source.”251 These words are clear and do not require
further interpretation. Even assuming the EPA’s contention that the
statute is ambiguous, the EPA’s interpretation is unreasonable in
light of the stated purpose of the CWA. The Water Transfers Rule
allows some waterways of the United States to become more
polluted. It is beyond unreasonable to interpret an act entitled the
Clean Water Act to allow for making water less clean.
Louisiana needs the protection that the Water Transfers Rule
takes away. There needs to be protection of the wetlands. The
wetlands provide important protection from hurricanes and are
home to many different species of wildlife. Fishermen depend on
the wetlands for their livelihood. The wetlands constitute a
meaningfully distinct body of water and need to have TMDLs
established to monitor the level of pollutants. Establishing TMDLs
then requires NPDES permits for any discharge of pollutants into
the wetlands so as to maintain the TMDL limit.
Once the sediment diversions are required to adhere to the
TMDL established for the wetlands, the diversions (run by the
state) will have an incentive to purchase Water Quality Credits
from upstream nonpoint sources, thereby reducing not only the
concentration of pollutants in the Mississippi River, but also the
concentration of pollutants in the Louisiana wetlands. The Water
Quality Credit Trading Program will produce a cost-effective
reduction in pollution of the Nation’s waters.
Michael E. Landis∗

251. 33 U.S.C. §1362(12)(A) (2012).
∗ J.D./D.C.L., 2015, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
I owe thanks to my advisor, Ed Richards, Clarence W. Edwards Professor of
Law, LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center, my loving and supportive parents, my
patient girlfriend, and the entire Editorial Board of the Journal of Energy Law
and Resources. Perhaps most deservingly, I also thank Beth Williams and
Melissa Lonegrass for their invaluable advice and guidance and non-wavering
dedication to the Journal.

